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In this study, we explored the relation of two different measures used to investigate infants’
expectations about goal-directed actions. In previous studies, expectations about action
outcomes have been either measured after the action has been terminated, that is post-
hoc (e.g., via looking time) or during the action is being performed, that is online (e.g.,
via predictive gaze). Here, we directly compared both types of measures. Experiment 1
demonstrated a dissociation between looking time and predictive gaze for 9-month-olds.
Looking time reflected identity-related expectations whereas predictive gaze did not. If at
all, predictive gaze reflected location-related expectations. Experiment 2, including a wider
age range, showed that the two measures remain dissociated over the first 3 years of life. It
is only after the third birthday that the dissociation turns into an association, with both mea-
sures then reflecting identity-related expectations. We discuss these findings in terms of
an early dissociation between two mechanisms for action expectation. We speculate that
while post-hoc measures primarily tap ventral mechanisms for processing identity-related
information (at least at a younger age), online measures primarily tap dorsal mechanisms
for processing location-related information.
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INTRODUCTION
A hallmark of social-cognitive development is the ability to under-
stand others’ actions flexibly and quickly. Infants have been shown
to do so at an early age. Furthermore, at this early age, infants
interpret the various components that constitute actions, such as
intentions and goals as well as movements and means involved in
achieving goals (Wagner and Carey, 2005).
One way to assess infants’ action perception is to measure
their expectations about a forthcoming action, together with
their responses when these expectations are met or violated. Two
approaches have been predominantly used to do this. In the post-
hoc approach, expectations are measured via looking time, for
example in response to an observed action that is completed (e.g.,
Woodward, 1998). In contrast, the online approach is to measure
expectations in anticipation of forthcoming action, for example,
through predictive gaze during the observation of an ongoing
action (e.g., Falck-Ytter et al., 2006). In the present study, we com-
bined these two approaches in order to investigate how measures
assessing infants’ expectations post-hoc and online of are related
to each other in development.
THE POST-HOC APPROACH
The measurement of looking times as an indicator of infants’ cog-
nition has been one of the most powerful tools in infancy research
through the past 30 years. In a typical paradigm, infants are first
habituated to a standard event. During the phase of habituation,
infants build a representation of this specific event that allows them
to form expectations about future events of a similar structure.
Once a habituation criterion has been reached, two test events are
presented that are variations of the habituation event. In one of
the test events, the previously built expectations are met, in the
other event, these expectations are violated. Longer looking times
to one of the two test events indicate that the infants differenti-
ated between the two events, that is, they could make use of the
representation build previously and apply it to a novel situation.
In the context of infants’ perception of goal-directed actions,
post-hoc measures were used to assess whether infants’ expecta-
tions about the outcome of an action are violated (resulting in
longer looking time) or not when presented with test trials in
which specific aspects of an observed action are altered compared
to previously presented familiarization trials. To exemplify, Wood-
ward (1998) habituated 6-month-olds to a hand reaching for one
of two objects. In test trials, object locations were swapped and the
hand either reached for the old object in a new location or the new
object in the old location. Infants looked longer when the hand
had reached for the new, relative to the old object, suggesting that
they encoded the goal of the reaching action during familiarization
and reacted with extended looking time when the agent changed its
goal during test. Further studies using looking time have demon-
strated that 6- to 12-month-olds encode goals of incomplete
actions (Daum et al., 2008), the rationality of observed actions
(Gergely et al., 1995), recognize the goal-directedness of success-
ful, and failed reaching actions (Brandone and Wellman, 2009),
and recognize goals of action sequences (Sommerville and Wood-
ward, 2005), to list only a few. Looking time measurements allow a
direct comparison between different sources of information (e.g.,
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goal location vs. identity); however, infants’ responses are mea-
sured with low spatial and temporal resolution making it difficult
to relate looking time data to underlying processes, a fact that has
been discussed by a large set of research in the past already (e.g.,
Aslin, 2007).
THE ONLINE APPROACH
The use of online prediction to investigate infants’ cognitive
processes and sensorimotor integration has a similarly long tra-
dition in infancy research. Studies using predictive reaching have
shown that at the same age that infants start to reach for stationary
objects, they start to reach for slowly moving objects (von Hofsten
and Lindhagen, 1979). Furthermore, infants’ reaching movements
have been shown to be predictive: Arm and hand movements
are initiated before the target is within reaching distance, and are
directed toward a future interception position (von Hofsten, 1980,
1983; Clifton et al., 1993). Infants’ reaching and grasping abil-
ities have been shown to be predictive in various other aspects
like adjusting the orientation (Lockman et al., 1984; von Hofsten
and Fazel-Zandy, 1984; von Hofsten and Johansson, 2009) or the
aperture size of the hand relative to a target (von Hofsten and Rön-
nqvist, 1988), and by predicting the weight of an observed object
(Mounoud and Bower, 1974).
Measuring infants’ expectations online via predictive gaze is a
relatively novel approach in infancy research (Gredebäck et al.,
2010) although extensively used in adults (Flanagan and Johans-
son, 2003). This measure records an observer’s eye movements and
measures the ability to predict ongoing events (e.g., looking at the
final state of an event before accomplishment).
A growing number of eye tracking studies has reported infants’
abilities to predict the reappearance of objects that were shortly
occluded (for a methodological review see Gredebäck and von
Hofsten, 2007). This research has shown that infants as young as 4-
month-olds already predict the reappearance of shortly occluded
objects (Johnson et al., 2003; Rosander and von Hofsten, 2004).
At the age of 6 months, infants’ predictions are no longer con-
strained to linear motion paths but they now quickly adjust their
expectations to new non-linear motion paths (Kochukhova and
Gredebäck, 2007).
A second application of measuring predictive gaze has
been reported from studies testing infants’ categorization skills
(McMurray and Aslin, 2004; Kovacs and Mehler, 2009; Addyman
and Mareschal, 2010; Albareda-Castellot et al., 2011). McMur-
ray and Aslin (2004), for example, developed an occlusion based
anticipatory eye movement (AEM) paradigm where infants were
presented with a training session in which one of two objects disap-
peared behind a T-shaped occluder and reappeared in one of two
locations, depending on the identity of the moving object. Their
results showed that infants learned to categorize different stimuli
along a variety of stimulus dimensions such as color, orientation,
or shape.
Measuring predictive gaze is specifically interesting in the con-
text of investigating infants’ perception of others’ actions, as an
action per se includes anticipation (von Hofsten, 2004). There are
a number of studies using eye tracking to measure infants’ expec-
tations online via predictive gaze. These studies have, for example,
demonstrated that 6-month-olds predict that food will be brought
to the mouth (Kochukhova and Gredebäck, 2010) and that 12- to
14-month-olds predict the goal of manual object displacements
(Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; Melzer et al., 2012) and reaching actions
(Gredebäck et al., 2009; Kanakogi and Itakura, 2011; Cannon and
Woodward, 2012). The measurement of eye movements in general
and of predictive gaze shifts in specific allows a detailed mapping
of the spatial and temporal dynamics of infants’ action percep-
tion. In the same line as online measures offer advantages as
compared to post-hoc measures, such as the track behavior on
a fine-grained time scale, it has its limitations, for example, by
constrained processing time and information.
COMPARING THE TWO APPROACHES
Post-hoc and online measures have not always revealed similar-
ities in onset and development of action expectations, Cannon
and Woodward (2012), for example, report predictive gaze shifts
toward the correct target at the age of 11 months, while Woodward
(1998) reports differences in looking times already being present at
5–6 months (or even earlier, as reported by Luo, 2011). One reason
for this difference might be that the bases on which these expec-
tations are built differ with respect to available information and
time constraints. When measured post-hoc, expectations about an
action are compared to the outcome of an action after it has been
completed. The information about the action is complete. In con-
trast, when expectations are measured online, the measurement
takes place prior to the completion of an observed action. The
information about the action available is thus incomplete.
Given these differences, little is known about how these two
measures relate to each other; whether they, for example, tap sim-
ilar or different underlying cognitive systems. Only few studies
have simultaneously used two different measures to assess infants’
action expectations (Gredebäck and Melinder, 2010; Paulus et al.,
2011b). Gredebäck and Melinder (2010) demonstrated that 6-
and 12-month-olds’ responses were more experience-dependent
and developed later when measured online (via predictive gaze)
than when measured post-hoc (via pupil dilations). Paulus et al.
(2011b) showed that infants’ predictions did not reflect their look-
ing times in an adapted version of the rational action paradigm as
reported by Gergely et al. (1995).
This is first evidence that action perception abilities might be
based on different underlying mechanisms and that more atten-
tion is required to map out what processes are tapped when
investigating infants’ action perception.
Our aim here is to further explore the relation of the two
approaches and the respective different measures that are used to
investigate infants’ action perception. Looking time studies have
shown that infants expect actions to be organized around goal
identities rather than goal locations (Woodward, 1998). A great
majority of predictive gaze studies within the domain of action
perception, however, used single goals at fixed locations (Falck-
Ytter et al., 2006; Cannon et al., 2012) or an assembly of similar
goal objects at the same location (Gredebäck et al., 2009), leav-
ing the question open whether predictive gaze is based on goal
identity or location (see Paulus et al., 2011b; Cannon and Wood-
ward,2012, for exceptions). We adapted the looking time paradigm
introduced by Woodward (1998) that includes two different goals
at two distinct locations and combined it with a predictive gaze
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paradigm (similar to McMurray and Aslin, 2004; Kochukhova and
Gredebäck, 2007).
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, infants’ action expectations were measured via
looking times and predictive gaze shifts. The paradigm that was
used primarily followed the logic of Woodward (1998); infants
were familiarized with an agent moving toward one of two objects.
In a subsequent test phase, the positions of the two objects were
swapped and the agent either moved toward the old object on a
new movement path (old goal/new path event) or to the new object
on the old movement path (new goal/old path event). In order to
be able to measure looking times and predictive gaze shifts at the
same time, the original paradigm was modified as follows.
First, to trigger predictive gaze shifts, we followed the ratio-
nale of the occlusion based AEM paradigm (McMurray and
Aslin, 2004) by adding an circular occluder in the center of the
screen (similar to Kochukhova and Gredebäck, 2007). The agent
moved toward the occluder, disappeared below the occluder and
reappeared at the side of one of two targets, see Figure 1.
Second, in order to have a well-defined agent that completely
disappears behind the occluder, we replaced the human hand by
an animated agent, a small red fish, who moved fish-like (i.e., by
wiggling its tail). Animated agents have been successfully used in
studies investigating infants’ action expectations. Beginning with
6 months, infants are sensitive for the goal-directed behavior and
the rationality of a wide range of human as well as animated agents
(Csibra et al., 2003; Kamewari et al., 2005; Wagner and Carey, 2005;
New Goal / Old Path Event Old Goal / New Path Event
Familiarization Phase
A B
C
FIGURE 1 | An example of the stimulus presentation during
familiarization trials (upper panel) and during the test trials (lower
panels) in Experiment 1. The upper panel additionally indicates there
appearance AOIs (not including the white area covered by the inner circle)
for the calculation of predictive gaze. Reappearance AOI A indicates the
area of a goal-related prediction. Reappearance AOI B indicates the area of
a non-goal-related prediction. Additionally, start area C is the area where the
gaze originated from previous to prediction. In the lower left panel, the
target AOIs that were used to measure the looking time to the respective
targets are depicted additionally.
Csibra, 2008; Schlottmann and Ray, 2010). Using a paradigm sim-
ilar to Woodward (1998), infants at the age of 6 months (Luo and
Baillargeon, 2005) and even as young as 3 months (Luo, 2011)
attribute goals to animated non-human agents. The agent that
was used in the present study was designed to entail a variety of
cues that have been shown to be help infants to perceive actions as
goal-directed (e.g., self-propelledness, Biro and Leslie, 2007).
Third, we used a partially infant-controlled familiarization pro-
cedure and presented a fixed number of eight familiarization trials
to each infant. This familiarization procedure has been successfully
used in previous studies investigating infants’ goal attribution abil-
ities using modified versions of the original Woodward paradigm
(Hofer et al., 2007, 2008).
We tested 9-month-old infants as infants at this age show a
robust goal attribution effect and anticipate action goals (Hun-
nius and Bekkering, 2010). Our hypothesis about the looking time
results was clear. Based on the previous findings mentioned above,
we expected infants to look longer at new goal/old path events
compared to old goal/new path events. The hypotheses concern-
ing predictive gaze were less obvious. Based on previous results,
two outcomes concerning the infants’ predictions are conceivable.
First, if infants attribute goals to an agent based on the identity
of the goal as expected by their looking time (and as reported by
Woodward, 1998), infants’ predictions should likewise be related
to the identity of the goal (Cannon and Woodward, 2012). Second,
and in contrast, 6-month-olds rapidly learn location-related asso-
ciations in occlusion based AEM paradigms (McMurray and Aslin,
2004; Kochukhova and Gredebäck, 2007). Based on these findings
one might expect that infants’ predictions would be related to the
location of the goal.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 9-month-olds (n= 24; 11 girls; M= 9 months;
5 days; 8.20–9.15). Nineteen additional infants were excluded due
to fussiness (resulting in too few trials, n= 16) or experimenter
errors (n= 3). Infants had to administer a sufficient number of
trials for two dependent variables, looking times and predictive
gaze shifts. The fact that only the very first test trial could be ana-
lyzed with respect to predictive gaze shifts (see also below) was one
major cause for the high exclusion rate. Furthermore, the large
number of infants excluded from analysis (44%) is not unusual
for eye tracking studies (McMurray and Aslin, 2004) and does
not reflect the average exclusion rate as this was much smaller in
Experiment 2, see below. Infants were recruited from a database
of parents who had agreed to participate in infant studies.
Apparatus
The laboratory was unfurnished except for the test equipment. The
infants were seated in a car safety seat (Maxi Cosi Cabrio), which
was placed in front of the eye tracker. The stimuli were presented,
and gaze was measured using a Tobii 1750 near infrared eye tracker
(Tobii AB, Stockholm, Sweden) with an infant add-on (precision:
1˚, accuracy: 0.5˚, sampling rate: 50 Hz). A nine-point infant cal-
ibration was used. During calibration, a blue and white sphere
expanded and contracted (extended diameter= 3.3˚) in synchrony
with a sound. Viewing distance was approximately 60 cm, display
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size was 25˚× 21˚. For the measurement of the looking times, a
camera was positioned above the monitor and recorded a close-
up view of the infants, which was displayed on a control monitor.
Looking times were measured online by two trained observers (to
assess reliability).
Stimulus material
Stimulus material was generated using the software CINEMA
4D R10 and BodyPaint 3D (Maxon Computer GmbH,
www.maxon.net). It consisted of an agent (a red colored fish
with yellow tail, 2.9˚× 1.0˚), an occluder (wooden colored;
radius= 6.7˚), and two targets (a yellow duck, 3.4˚× 2.9˚) and
a green turtle, 4.3˚× 2.9˚), all presented on a blue background,
see Figure 1. The whole experiment consisted of eight familiariza-
tion trials, one intermediate trial where the positions of the targets
were swapped (swap trials) and six test trials. The familiarization
and the test trials consisted of the following sequence. First, the
agent first jumped up and down three times accompanied by a
sound to orient the infant to the screen (initial phase: 4000 ms).
The agent then moved swimming-like with a wiggling tail toward
the occluder and disappeared behind the occluder (pre-occlusion
movement from movement onset until the agent completely dis-
appeared behind the occluder: 2480 ms), the agent continued to
move under the occluder (occlusion time: 920 ms), reappeared
from behind the occluder and moved toward one of the targets
upon reappearing (post-occlusion movement from the first frame
of reappearance until the arrival at the goal: 3400 ms). Once at the
goal object, the agent poked it three times while the goal object
remained static (poking time: 2520 ms). The agent then remained
motionless until the trial was terminated. Looking time measure-
ment started when the agent touched the goal object until the
infant had looked away for 2 or 60 s had elapsed, at which time the
trial ended.
Prior to the test phase, infants were shown that the goal posi-
tions were swapped with no agent present. Subsequently, two
different test events were presented three times each, in alternating
order. In the old goal/new path event, the agent moved on a new
path toward the old goal (i.e., constant goal identity, changed goal
location). In the new goal/old path event, the agent moved on the
old path toward a new goal (i.e., changed goal identity, constant
goal location). Goal object, movement path, goal locations, and
test event presented first were counterbalanced between subjects.
DATA ANALYSIS
Post-hoc measure – looking time
Analogous to Woodward (1998) and as described above, look-
ing time toward the whole display was coded during all famil-
iarization and test trials online from a control monitor by two
trained observers who were unaware of the condition (inter-rater
agreement was 83%).
Online measure – predictive gaze shifts
Two gaze measurements were calculated based on the previous
study investigating predictive gaze shifts in an occlusion paradigm
(Kochukhova and Gredebäck, 2007). For this, the area of the video
presentation was divided into three further areas of interest (AOI;
see Figure 1, upper panel). AOI A and B (reappearance AOIs)
covered each 90˚ of the occluder edge. These areas extended both
inside and outside the occluder, covering all but the final 2˚ near
the occluder center and extending outwards to cover the entire
amplitude of the agent’s motion.
Gaze shifts were first categorized to be predictive or reactive.
Predictive gaze shifts included all trials in which infants shifted
their gaze across the occluder to target area A or B (see Figure 1)
before the agent had been visible for 200 ms after occlusion. Reac-
tive gaze shifts included all trials in which infants shifted their gaze
across the occluder to target area A or B after the agent had been
visible for 200 ms. This criterion was based on the average reactive
saccadic latency to moving targets in adults (Engel et al., 1999)
and infants (Gredebäck et al., 2006) and has been used in previ-
ous studies (e.g., Kochukhova and Gredebäck, 2007). Two primary
scores, prediction rate and accuracy rate were calculated separately
for each infant based on percentage scores.
Prediction rate. The prediction rate reports how often infants
predicted the reappearance of the agent relative to the total num-
ber of attended trials. It is important to note that this measurement
focuses on the timing of infants’ gaze shift over the occluder and
does not take into account at which location the infants predicted
the agent to reappear.
Accuracy rate. Second, the accuracy rate reports where infants
predicted the agent’s reappearance; the number of predictions
directed toward the target AOIs during familiarization was divided
by the total number of gaze shifts (predictions and reactions)
across the occluder. During familiarization, the goal-related accu-
racy rate (proportion of predictions toward the goal object)
and the non-goal-related accuracy rate (proportion of predictions
toward the other, non-goal object) were calculated. During test
trials the identity-related accuracy rate (predictions being directed
based on the identity of the goal during familiarization, i.e., toward
the old goal on the new path) and the location-related accuracy rate
(predictions being directed based on the location of the goal dur-
ing familiarization, i.e., toward the new goal on the old path) were
calculated.
Additional measures – specific looking times
Finally, the measurement of eye movement data allowed for a
more detailed analysis of the position where infants were looking
at what point in time during stimulus presentation. Accordingly,
we were specifically interested in the proportion of looking time
the infants spent looking at the areas of each of the two targets
during the measurement of looking time. As for the looking times
to the overall display, the measurement of these looking times
was conducted after the agent had arrived at the respective goal
during familiarization and test phase. In contrast to the measure-
ment of the looking times to the overall display, this looking time
measurement was calculated from the eye tracking data.
Additionally, to check whether the infants had seen the targets
at their new locations, during the swap trial the looking time to the
AOI around the two targets (target AOIs) was measured by count-
ing the data points of infants gaze pattern that were located within
this AOIs. The respective target AOIs are depicted in Figure 1
(lower left panel) and covered 7.2˚× 6.4˚ starting from the upper
and left/right border of the stimulus display.
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Inclusion criteria
With respect to looking time, all familiarization and test trials
were analyzed. With respect to the calculation of prediction rate
and accuracy rate, all familiarization trials and the first test trial
were analyzed. Because the agent reappeared in all of the test tri-
als, infants received feedback about the agent’s behavior during
the test trials immediately after the agent reappeared in the first
test trial. For this reason, only the first test trial could be analyzed.
In this first test trial, the infants had not yet received any feedback
about the agent’s behavior after the positions of the targets had
been swapped.
To be included in the data analysis, infants had to provide valid
data for at least four out of eight familiarization trials, the swap
trial, and four out of six test trials including the first test trial. For
the looking times, these inclusion criteria had to be met during the
phase when the looking time was measured. For the gaze shifts, a
trial was classified to be valid if infants had tracked the agent prior
to the occlusion passage and if they fixated one of the two possible
target AOIs before or after the agent reappeared.
RESULTS
In the results section we first report how many children and trials
were included in the data analysis. Then, the data of the looking
time as our post-hoc measure followed by the predictive gaze shifts
as our online measure and then directly compare the two measures.
This is followed by a more detailed analysis of the looking times
toward different AOI.
Looking times were analyzed using parametric analyses of vari-
ance (ANOVA) and t -tests. The analyses of the prediction and
accuracy rates were performed using non-parametric Wilcoxon
Signed Ranks tests. The data level did not justify parametri-
cal analyses because the categorization of the gaze shifts to be
predictive or reactive resulted in nominal scaled data.
Inclusion rates
All infants provided looking times during the first two familiariza-
tion trials (Fam12) and the last two familiarization trials (Fam78).
During test, one infant provided data only for one out of all six old
goal/new path trials, all other infants provided looking time data
for all six test trials.
With respect to the analysis of gaze shifts, the following num-
bers of trials were included in the final analysis (percentage scores
reflect number of included trials relative to number of presented
trials): Total number of trials equaled 206 (95.4%). Number of
Fam12 trials equaled 47 (97.9%); Number of Fam78 trials equaled
45 (93.4%); Number of Test1 trials equaled 24 (100.0%). Dur-
ing Fam12, one infant provided data from only one trial; during
Fam78, one infant provided no data, and one data from only one
trial; during Test1, all infants provided data from the first test trial.
For the parametric analyses, the data of the infant who provided
no data during Fam78 (1 out of 24 participants) was replaced by
the respective grand mean to keep data loss minimal.
Post-hoc measure – looking time
Looking time decreased from Fam12 (M= 13.81 s, SD= 5.72 s)
to Fam78 (M= 9.40s, SD= 3.62s), t (23)= 3.19; p< 0.01. A 2× 2
[Test Event (new goal/old path; old goal/new path)×Order (new
goal/old path events first; old goal/new path event first)] ANOVA
revealed a significant main effect of test event, the infants looked
longer at new goal (M= 9.57 s, SD= 3.97 s) than old goal events
(M= 7.30 s, SD= 3.15 s),F(1, 22)= 6.77,p= 0.02. There was nei-
ther a main effect of order nor an interaction of order and test,
both Fs< 1. A non-parametric Sign test supported this result: 19
infants looked longer at new goal/old path events compared to five
infants who looked longer at old goal/new path events, p< 0.01.
As such, looking time results as a post-hoc measure replicate prior
studies using the Woodward paradigm (Woodward, 1998; Luo and
Baillargeon, 2005; Sommerville and Woodward, 2005) by demon-
strating longer looking times when the agent moved along the
same path as during familiarization to reach a new goal compared
to when the agent moved on a new path to reach the same goal
that was approached during familiarization.
Online measure – prediction rate
The infants performed predictive gaze shifts in roughly three-
quarters of the trials, independent of the experimental phase.
The prediction rate equaled 72.8% (SD= 22.2) over all familiar-
ization trials and did neither change significantly from Fam12
(M = 72.9%, SD= 39.0) to Fam78 (M = 71.7%, SD= 35.6),
Z = 0.0, p= 1, nor from Fam78 to Test1 (M = 62.5%, SD= 49.5),
Z =−0.36, p= 0.72 (Wilcoxon test). These findings demonstrate
that infants most often predicted that the fish will reappear from
behind the occluder; this was true for both familiarization and
test trials. In the following section we analyzed where the infants
expected the agent to reappear.
Online measure – accuracy rate
Accuracy rates are presented in Table 1. During the familiarization,
the goal-related accuracy rated was significantly higher than the
non-goal-related accuracy rate during familiarization,Z =−2.15,
p= 0.03. It did furthermore not change from Fam12 to Fam78,
Z =−0.24, p= 0.98. The infants correctly predicted the agents’
movement during familiarization.
As this analysis has shown that the infants had learned to
correctly predict the reappearance of the agent during famil-
iarization, the most relevant further analysis is to compare the
(high) goal-related accuracy rate at the end of the familiarization
phase (Fam78) to both the identity-related and the location-
related accuracy rate in Test1. Comparing accuracy rates in the
transition between familiarization (Fam78) and test trials (Test1)
demonstrates that the goal-related accuracy rate was marginally
higher than the identity-related accuracy rate in Test1,Z =−1.58,
p= 0.11, and did not differ from the location-related accuracy
rate in Test1, Z =−0.56, p= 0.58. These results indicate that
infants performed less identity-related predictions in Test1 than
goal-related predictions in Fam78, while the location-related pre-
dictions in Test1 did not differ from non-goal-related predictions
in Fam78.
Comparison of looking time and eye movements
To directly compare looking time and predictive gaze, we com-
pared the number of infants who looked longer at the new goal/old
path events, thus did not expect a change of identity of the goal of
the agent when measured post-hoc (19 out of 24, 79.2%) to the
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Table 1 | Mean accuracy rates in % (and Standard Deviations) during the first and the last two familiarization trials (Fam 12, Fam78) and the test
trials (first test trial in experiment 1 and first two test trials in experiment 2.
Experimental phase Accuracy rate Age
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
9 Months All ages 9 Months 12 Months 24 Months 36 Months Adults
Fam 12 Goal-related 47.9 (8.8) 40.3 (8.0) 47.8 (8.8) 39.6 (8.0) 29.2 (6.7) 54.2 (7.9) 30.4 (7.8)
Non-goal-related 25.0 (6.7) 31.8(7.2) 30.4 (6.6) 37.5 (6.9) 27.1 (6.0) 31.3(7.9) 32.6(8.8)
Fam78 Goal-related 47.8 (8.2) 53.9 (8.4) 47.9 (9.3) 52.1 (8.2) 50.0(8.0) 62.2 (8.2) 54.2(8.5)
Non-goal-related 23.9 (6.6) 18.9(6.3) 25.0 (7.4) 16.7(5.8) 12.5 (5.4) 19.6 (6.6) 20.8 (6.7)
Test Identity-related 25.0 (9.0) 42.2 (8.5) 25.0 (7.4) 27.1 (8.0) 41.7(8.9) 58.3 (7.8) 58.7(8.3)
Location-related 37.5(10.1) 34.3 (8.5) 47.9 (8.8) 41.7(9.2) 39.6 (9.0) 27.1 (7.4) 15.2(5.6)
number of infants showing identity-related predictions in Test1
(6 out of 24, 25%) using a Chi-square test, χ2(1, N= 48)= 14.1,
p< 0.001. The number of infants who performed identity-related
predictions during Test1 was much smaller than the number of
infants who performed identity-related looking times. Interest-
ingly, all six infants who performed identity-related predictions
the first test trial showed respective identity-related looking times
and looked longer in the new goal/old path test events.
Although this result has to be interpreted with great care, as
the number of infants per cell is very small, it indicates that
those infants, who show identity-related processing of the agent
when measured online, do so as well when measured post-hoc.
In contrast, the reverse is not true, infants who show identity-
related processing when measured post-hoc, do not necessarily
show identity-related processing when measured online.
Additional measures – proportion of looking times toward different
AOIs
Finally, to look more closely at the infants looking during the dif-
ferent experimental phases, we calculated the proportion of time
infants spent looking toward the two target AOIs (looking time
toward respective AOI divided by the total looking time as respec-
tively measured by the eye tracker). During familiarization, infants
looked longer at the goal object (proportion of looking time:
M = 44.5%, SD= 13.9) than at the non-goal object (M = 15.2%,
SD= 6.0), t (23)= 8.71, p< 0.001. This looking behavior did not
change from Fam12 (goal object:M = 45.2%, SD= 18.2, non-goal
object: M = 19.6%, SD= 9.2) to Fam78 (goal object: M = 41.9%,
SD= 16.7, non-goal object: M = 11.5%, SD= 6.9) indicated by
a main effect of target (goal object vs. non-goal object), F(1,
23)= 58.73, p< 0.001 and no interaction with phase (Fam12 vs.
Fam78), F< 1. A main effect of phase, F(1, 23)= 11.59, p= 0.002,
indicates that the proportion of looking toward the two objects
decreased from Fam12 to Fam78. This result indicates that during
the familiarization phase, the infants primarily looked at the goal
object where the agent was.
During the swap trial the infants looked equally long at the
goal object (M = 24.2%, SD= 14.4) and the non-goal object
(M = 31.7%, SD= 16.8), t (23)= 1.31, p= 0.20.
Finally, the looking proportions during the test events were
analyzed using a 2× 2× 2 [Test Event (old goal/new path vs.
new goal/old path)×Target (old goal vs. new goal)×Order (old
goal/new path event presented first vs. new goal/old path event
presented first)] repeated measures ANOVA with test event and
target as within-subjects factors and order as between factor. This
analysis only yielded a significant Test Event×Target interaction,
F(1, 22)= 51.59,p< 0.001. During old goal test events, the infants
looked longer at the old goal (M = 38.8%, SD= 18.9) than at
the other (new) goal (M = 10.6%, SD= 7.0). During the new
goal test events, the infants’ looking behavior was reversed; they
looked longer at the new goal (M = 36.3%, SD= 17.8) than at the
other (old) goal (M = 12.9%, SD= 9.1). As during the familiar-
ization trials, in the test trials, the infants primarily looked at the
goal object where the agent was located. Furthermore, the infants
looked at both objects during the swap trial and importantly, they
looked equally long at the two targets during this trial. This indi-
cates that the infants had observed that the positions of the two
targets had been swapped.
DISCUSSION
The looking time results of Experiment 1 replicate previous find-
ings (Woodward, 1998). When measured post-hoc, the infants
looked longer when the agent moved on the old path toward a
new goal compared to trials where the agent moved on a new
path toward the old goal. Following the logic of Woodward (1998)
infants built a representation about the agent’s goal during famil-
iarization. During test, when the positions of the targets had been
swapped, the infants’ expectation that the agent continues to move
toward the old goal was met in the old goal/new path condition
and was violated in the new goal/old path condition, resulting
in extended looking times in the latter condition. In line with
previous findings (Luo and Baillargeon, 2005; Csibra, 2008), this
suggests that at the age of 9 months, infants are able to interpret a
non-human agent’s behavior as goal-directed when expectations
are measured post-hoc.
Interestingly, the infants’ predictive eye movements did not
reflect their looking times. The results showed that the infants
learned to correctly predict the reappearance of the agent during
familiarization. However, during the first test trial infants showed
a tendency to base their predictions on the location of the goal
object as observed during familiarization.
A more detailed analysis of the looking times revealed that the
infants predominantly looked toward the target that the agent was
close to during both familiarization and test events. This finding
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has potential implications on the validity of the looking time task
that will further be discussed in the Section “General Discussion.”
An important issue to be raised at this point is the fact that
the present design does not allow for a distinction between
goal-anticipations and path-anticipations. There are two rea-
sons why we did not differentiate between these two measures.
First, due to the restriction to only one test trial given by the
paradigm, dividing the infants’ eye movements into goal- and
path-directed gaze shifts resulted in a small number of test tri-
als. Accordingly, the validity of such a measure would be lim-
ited. Second, more theoretically grounded, in a goal-directed
action are goal and path mutually related. Anticipating the
path an agent includes – at least in the present paradigm –
the consideration of the goal the agent has. And vice versa,
anticipating the goal includes the consideration of the path the
agent takes. We did not differentiate between the two forms of
anticipation.
To sum up, the main goal of the present Experiment1 was to
compare an online with a post-hoc measure for infants’ action
perception and to test whether infants base their predictions of
the goal of an observed action based on the identity of the goal
as suggested by previous findings using post hoc looking time
measures (first hypothesis; e.g., Woodward, 1998), or on the loca-
tion of the goal (second hypothesis; e.g., McMurray and Aslin,
2004; Addyman and Mareschal, 2010; Albareda-Castellot et al.,
2011; Paulus et al., 2011b) as observed during familiarization.
There is no definite answer to this question. The present results
point toward a dissociation between looking time and predic-
tive gaze and allow therefore a rejection of the first hypothesis.
It is, however, less clear, what the basis of the infants’ pre-
diction was as the results are ambiguous with respect to the
two hypotheses. Furthermore, our conclusions are based on the
performance of a few infants providing only one data point
during the test trials. This might question the validity of the
present data. For these reasons, we modified the paradigm used
in Experiment 1 in order to replicated and extend the findings
of Experiment 1 and to further explore the development of this
potential dissociation.
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2, we modified the paradigm from Experiment
1 to make it (a) a more prediction-oriented eye tracking para-
digm and (b) to further strengthen processes of goal attribution
by adding, for example, action effects. Additionally, we included
a wider age range to investigate the developmental trajectory of
responses when expectations are measured online.
METHOD
Participants
We tested 9-month-olds (n= 24; 7 girls; M = 9.3; 8.17–9.13),
12-month-olds (n= 24; 9 girls; M= 12.5; 11.17–12.15), 24-
month-olds (n= 24; 14 girls; M= 24.2; 23.15–24.14), 36-month-
olds (n= 24; 8 girls; M= 36.8; 34.23–37.6), and adults (n= 24;
13 female; M= 24 years; 19–34 years). Additionally, fourteen 9-
month-olds, six 12-month-olds, nine 24-month-olds, and two
36-month-olds were excluded from analysis due to fussiness or
procedural errors.
Stimuli, apparatus, procedure, and data analysis
Stimulus material and procedure were adapted from Experiment
1 with the following modifications. We were concerned that the
infants’ predictions in Experiment 1 were biased by the long
inter-trial periods. These were caused by the measurements of
the infants’ looking times resulting in periods up to 60 s depend-
ing on the infants’ looking behavior. In order to present trials
in a higher frequency we shortened the trials and did no longer
measure infants’ looking time.
Another reason why the infants did not predict the reap-
pearance of the agent based on goal identity might have been
that the stimulus presentation did not trigger goal attribution
processes strong enough. For this reason, we strengthened these
goal attribution processes by applying the following modifications:
First, the targets were more distinct. In Experiment 1, both tar-
gets were animals; the infants might, thus, have processed both
targets in terms of one category (animal) instead of two dis-
tinct targets (duck and turtle). We now followed more closely
the targets as used by Woodward (1998) and replaced the tur-
tle by an inanimate ball. Second, the agent’s poking of the goal
object now caused a salient effect (during the poking, the goal
object moved up and down while making a laughing sound).
Previous research has shown that adding and effect to an unfa-
miliar action helps 6-month-olds to interpret the respective
action as object-directed (Hofer et al., 2007; Jovanovic et al.,
2007).
Finally, in order to be able to analyze more test trials, no more
feedback was provided during the test events; the agent never reap-
peared from behind the occluder. This allowed us to repeat the
test trial, thereby gaining additional data that will reduce noise
and provide a more solid assessment of individual infants’ and
children’s prediction and accuracy rate.
Goal identity, movement path, and goal locations were coun-
terbalanced between participants. Accuracy and prediction rates
were calculated as in Experiment 1. In addition, movement times
were the same as in Experiment 1, the duration of the swap trial
was 15 s, the test trials were presented for 10 s after the agent dis-
appeared behind the occluder. Participants of all age groups were
only told to watch the movies closely, without further instructions.
RESULTS
In the results section we first report how many children and trials
were included in the data analysis, then, prediction and accuracy
rates are reported. Finally, the individual age groups are analyzed
separately. As in Experiment 1, the data level did not justify para-
metrical testing, accordingly, the non-parametric analyses were
performed using Kruskal–Wallis tests and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks
tests.
Inclusion rates
The following numbers of trials were included in the final data
analysis. The total number of trials (maximum: 240 trials; includ-
ing 192 familiarization and 48 test trials) equaled 229 (95.4%)
for the 9-month-olds, 223 (92.9%) for the 12-month-olds, 227
(94.6%) for the 24-month-olds, 228 (95.0%) for the 36-month-
olds, and 232 (96.7%) for the adults. Number of Fam12 trials
(maximum: 48 trials) equaled 46 (95.8%) for the 9-month-olds,
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the 12-month-olds, the 24-month-olds, and the adults, each, and
equaled 47 (97.9%) for the 36-month-olds. One 9-month-old,
and one adult provided no data during Fam12, two 12-month-
olds, two 24-month-olds, and one 36-month-old provided only
one trial, all other participants provided data in both trials. Num-
ber of Fam78 trials (maximum: 48 trials) equaled 42 (87.5%)
for the 9-month-olds, 44 (91.7%) for the 12-month-olds, 46
(95.8%) for the 24-month-olds, 42 (87.5%) for the 36-month-
olds, and 47 (97.9%) for the adults. One 36-month-old pro-
vided no data during, six 9-month-olds, four 12-month-olds,
two 24-month-olds, four 36-month-olds, and one adult provided
only one trial, all other participants provided data for both tri-
als. Number of Test12 trials (maximum: 48 trials) equaled 48
(100.0%) for the 9-month-olds, 42 (87.5%) for the 12-month-
olds, 43 (89.6%) for the 24-month-olds, 46 (95.8%) for the
36-month-olds, and 44 (91.7%) for the adults. Six 12-month-
olds, five 24-month-olds two 36-month-old, and four adults pro-
vided only one trial, all other participants provided data in both
trials.
Online measure – prediction rate
Prediction rate equaled 74.7% (SD= 25.8) over all familiarization
trials and age groups. Kruskal–Wallis tests revealed no differences
between the age groups for the prediction rates over all familiariza-
tion trials [χ2(4, N= 120)= 7.07, p= 0.13], as well as for Fam12
[χ2(4, N= 120)= 9.03, p= 0.06], Fam78 [χ2(4, N= 120)= 4.16,
p= 0.39], and Test12 [χ2(4, N= 120)= 2.58, p= 0.63]. Over all
age groups, prediction rate did not change from Fam78 trials
(M = 72.7%, SD= 39.5) to Test12 trials (M = 76.5%, SD= 36.1),
Z =−1.02,p= 0.31 (Wilcoxon test). The prediction rate in Exper-
iment 2 was comparable for the different age groups and for
the different experimental phases. Similar to Experiment 1, the
participants predicted in almost three-quarter of the trials that
the fish will reappear from behind the occluder, both during
familiarization and test trials.
Online measure – accuracy rate
Familiarization phase. We first checked whether the accuracy
rates during the familiarization phase changed over age using
Kruskal–Wallis tests. This was not the case, neither for the goal-
related accuracy rate, χ2(4, N= 120)= 5.40, p= 0.25, nor for the
non-goal-related accuracy rate, χ2(4, N= 120)= 2.65, p= 0.62,
see Figure 2. Accordingly, to test whether the two accuracy rates
differed from each other during familiarization, data was collapsed
across age groups. As in Experiment 1, during familiarization, the
goal-related accuracy rate was higher than the non-goal-related
accuracy rate, Z =−5.66, p< 0.001 (Wilcoxon test).
Test phase. The same analyses were performed for the accuracy
rates during the test phase. As can be seen in Figure 2, the identity-
related accuracy rate increased over age, χ2(4, N= 120)= 15.37,
p= 0.004, and marginally, the location-related accuracy rate
decreased over age,χ2(4,N= 120)= 8.28,p= 0.08 (both Kruskal–
Wallis tests). Accordingly, the accuracy rates of the different age
groups were analyzed separately and are reported in further detail
in the following section.
Analysis of individual age groups
As in Experiment 1, participants of all age groups had learned
to correctly predict the reappearance of the agent during famil-
iarization. In the next step, we compared the (high) goal-related
accuracy rate at the end of the familiarization phase (Fam78) to
both the identity-related and the location-related accuracy rate
in Test12. The results indicate that the 9-month-olds showed
a marginally significant change when the goal-related accu-
racy rate was compared to the identity-related accuracy rate,
Z =−1.69, p= 0.09, but no significant change when it was com-
pared to location-related accuracy rate: Z =−0.04, p= 0.97. The
same pattern was found in the 12-month-olds, who significantly
changed their looking behavior from Fam78 to Test12, indi-
cated by a significant decrease of the identity-related accuracy
rate, Z =−2.55, p= 0.01, but no change to the location-related
accuracy rate, Z =−0.96, p= 0.37. In the 24-month-olds, look-
ing behavior did neither concerning the identity-related accuracy
rate, Z = 0.72, p= 0.42, nor the location-related accuracy rate,
Z =−0.88, p= 0.38. In the 36-month-olds, no change of look-
ing behavior was observed to the identity-related accuracy rate,
Z =−0.59, p= 0.55, but here, a significant change to the location-
related accuracy rate was found, Z =−2.85, p= 0.004. The same
pattern was found in the adults where no change to the identity-
related accuracy rate was observed,Z =−0.30, p= 0.77, but again
a significant change to location-related accuracy rate, Z =−3.36,
p= 0.001.
These changes from familiarization to test phase indicate, that
the youngest two age groups continued to predict the reappear-
ance of the agent on the basis of the previously observed location of
the goal, while the oldest two age groups continued to predict the
reappearance of the agent on the basis of the previously observed
identity of the goal.
Looking times during swap trials
Additionally, we calculated the proportion of looking time
toward the AOIs of the two targets and analyzed them by
means of a 2× 5 [Target (goal, non-goal during familiariza-
tion)×Age (9 months,12 months,24 months,36 months,adults)]
ANOVA that showed that the infants looked equally long at
both objects (goal: M = 28.1, SD= 16.1; non-goal: M = 27.9,
SD= 17.0), F< 1, and that the looking time decreased over age,
F(4, 115)= 4.13, p= 0.004. This age effect is based on the shorter
looking times of the adults (M = 20.4, SD= 12.8) compared to
all other age groups (9 months: M = 30.3, SD= 17.6; 12 months:
M = 28.5,SD= 17.4; 24 months:M = 31.7,SD= 17.6; 36 months:
M = 29.2, SD= 15.0), indicated by LSD-corrected post-hoc tests,
all ps< 0.01. No other differences between the age groups were
significant. The interaction of the two factors was not significant.
To ensure that the participants did look at the objects one sam-
ple t -tests against zero were performed for the looking proportion
toward the two objects separately for each age group that were all
significant, all ps< 0.001. All participants thus looked at the object
and they looked equally long at both objects during the swap trials.
DISCUSSION
Experiment 2 showed that the 36-month-olds and adults predicted
the reappearance of the agent in the test trials based on the identity
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FIGURE 2 | Development of predictive gaze during the last two
familiarization trials (A) and the test trials (B) across age groups in
Experiment 1 and 2. (A): filled circles represent the goal-related accuracy
rate; empty circles the non-goal-related accuracy rate. (B): filled diamonds
represent identity-related accuracy rate and empty diamonds the
location-related accuracy rate.
of the goal of the observed action. In contrast, the 12-month-olds,
and less clearly also the 9-month-olds based their predictions in
the test trials on the location of the goal during the familiariza-
tion phase. The latter finding replicates the results of Experiment 1
indicating a dissociation between looking time as a post-hoc mea-
sure and predictive gaze as an online measure. Although infants
do encode the identity of the action goal already at the age of
9 months when measured post-hoc, they base their predictions –
though less clearly – on the location of the action goal. It is not
before the age of 36 months, that children integrate goal identity
in their predictions.
The ambiguous findings of the 9-month-olds might be
explained by the fact that at this age, infants’ capacity to predict
action goals is in a developing phase. Recent studies have shown
that infants start to predict action goals at 6 months of age (Hun-
nius and Bekkering, 2010; Kochukhova and Gredebäck, 2010) and
that this capacity continues to develop over the following months
of life (Kenward, 2010; Paulus et al., 2011b), however reliable pre-
dictive gaze shifts are often not found before the age of 12 months
(Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; Melzer et al., 2012) or even older (Grede-
bäck et al., 2009). In the present study, there was no difference in
the overall rate of predictions between the two younger age groups,
already the 9-month-olds showed predictions in more then 70% of
the trials, so the 9-month-olds were principally able to predict the
agents’ action. However, during the test phase, the 12-month-olds
showed a clearer pattern of where their predictions were directed
toward. The data finally shows that the 24-month-olds seem to be
in a transition period, as their predictions were ambiguous. The
looking times during the swap trials ensured that participants of
all age groups have observed that the position of the targets has
changed from the familiarization to the test phase. Potential causes
and implications of this developmental trajectory from a dissoci-
ation between looking times and predictive gaze early in life to an
association of the two measures later in life will be discussed below.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the present study, we compared post-hoc measures of chil-
dren’s expectations about an observed goal-directed action with
online measures concerning their predictions about the same
action by combining a looking time paradigm with a predic-
tive gaze paradigm. The looking time results from Experiment
1 replicated Woodward’s (1998) original findings. Nine-month-
olds were shown to be sensitive to the identity of the goal of an
observed action when measured post-hoc.
The results of the analysis of the infants’ eye movements con-
trast the looking time results and showed at the age of 12 months
(and less reliably at the age of 9 months) infants predicted the
reappearance of the agent based on the location of the goal dur-
ing an observed action and that it was not until the age of 3, that
this dissociation disappeared and that children predicted the reap-
pearance of the agent after occlusion based on goal identity. These
findings indicate that post-hoc measures and online measures used
to investigate children’s action expectations are dissociated early
in life. They further support the second hypothesis put forward
in the introduction of Experiment 1 that early in life, infants con-
tinue to anticipate the reappearance of the agent in the test trials
location-related.
This finding is, on the one hand, to some extent surprising as
infants did encode the identity of the goal already at 9 months
when their expectations were measured post-hoc, but they were
not (yet) able to transfer this knowledge into their predictions.
On the other hand, this findings is not that surprising as we
know from previous findings that infants do take goal locations
into account when predicting the future behavior of an agent
(McMurray and Aslin, 2004; Addyman and Mareschal, 2010) and
in the present paradigm, the infants were not only familiarized
with the identity of the goal object but likewise with its location.
The question remains, why this behavior changes with increasing
age.
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FROM DISSOCIATION TO INTEGRATION
One answer to this question is that the computational processes
that are involved in processing observed actions are dissociated
early in life and become associated later: Early in life, action
expectations measured online seem to be organized around goal
locations whereas action expectations measured post-hoc around
goal identities. With increasing age, children then generally orga-
nize their action expectations primarily around goal identities. The
nature of this dissociation can either be interpreted as temporal or
procedural.
A temporal interpretation implies that the dissociation between
the two measures reflects two successive states on the processing
timeline of one common underlying mechanism. This mechanism
would act location-conservatively in an early processing phase dur-
ing the observation of an action, and identity-conservatively in
a later processing phase upon completion of the action. Action
expectations measured post-hoc and online thus rely on a differ-
ent amount of information available. During development, the
sensitivity to action goals shifts backward on the processing time-
line. Early in life, infants can derive goals only through post-hoc
comparison of their expectations with an observation, with suf-
ficient information and processing time available. Only later in
life can they already derive goals more quickly online, during
the observation of an ongoing action. This temporal interpre-
tation is further supported by the findings that 6-month-olds,
who were not yet able to anticipate the goal of a feeding action
when measured online did differentiate between rational and
non-rational feeding actions when measured post-hoc using pupil
dilation where the processing time was less constraint (Gredebäck
and Melinder, 2010). However, recent findings from a manual
search task are not consistent with this temporal interpretation.
When 2-year-old children were provided with additional time
to process an observed event and to plan a response to search
for a hidden object, performance did not improve (Mash et al.,
2006).
In contrast, according to a procedural interpretation, the disso-
ciation between the two measures reflects a dissociation between
two different mechanisms involved, one for processing goal loca-
tion and another for goal identity. These two mechanisms could
be separate early in life and only later become integrated under
the lead of the identity-related mechanism. This assumption is
reminiscent of the notion of the two visual pathways (Mishkin
and Ungerleider, 1982; Goodale and Milner, 1992) as a possible
underlying mechanism. The ventral (what ) pathway is associ-
ated with the processing of goal identity. The dorsal (where/how)
pathway provides online spatial control of movements required
for action execution and mediates the processing of goal loca-
tions. Both pathways are connected to the frontal eye field (Schall,
2002) that is involved in visual processing and inhibitory con-
trol (Schall et al., 2002; Muggleton et al., 2010). Evidence from
animals (Schroeder et al., 1998; Chen et al., 2007) and humans
(Rao et al., 2003) further suggests a dorsal-over-ventral advan-
tage showing faster processing of location-related compared to
identity-related information. These findings are mirrored by the
reported developmental pattern that in the first year of life, visual
processing seems to be driven primarily by the dorsal pathway
(Leslie et al., 1998; Mareschal et al., 1999). Mareschal and Johnson
(2003) further showed that young infants have difficulty in inte-
grating information coming from the two streams. The authors
suggest that it is the affordance of a target that determines which
of the two representations is maintained. When the targets were
non-manipulable objects like faces or asterisks, the infants primar-
ily responded to changes in identity like color and not to changes
in location. In contrast, when the targets presented were manip-
ulable toys, infants primarily responded to changes in location
and not in identity. In the present study we presented manipu-
lable toys as targets. Accordingly, the young infants might have
primarily responded to the location of the object, processed by
the dorsal stream, when their expectations were measured online
and could not integrate this with the information about the object
identity, processed by the ventral stream. Mareschal et al. (1999)
further suggest that a dissociation or a developmental lag only
occurs when it is necessary to integrate two sources of potentially
conflicting information, about location and identity. As they say
“This explanation predicts that tasks requiring access to only one
imprecise source of information or tasks that are performed with
a visible object will not result in a developmental lag. In con-
trast, any task that calls for the integration of cortically separable
representations will fail unless performed with a visible object or
with precise cortical representations.” (p. 307). The advantage of
the dorsal over the ventral stream found in the predictions of the
younger children might therefore be based on the nature of the
objects that were used as targets. The interpretation of Mareschal
et al. (1999) are based on findings from the non-social domain
and it remains a matter of further research to test whether the
can be generalized to a social domain that includes animate cues
as in the current paradigm and to test whether the dissociation
found here can be modulated when non-manipulable objects are
used as targets. It is, however, important to mention at this point,
that in the present study, the objects used are the same for the
two measures. Still, the infants do process the identity of the goal
object when measured post-hoc but do only at a later age when
measured online. The dissociation between the infants’ looking
times and their predictions can, thus, not be traced back solely to
the manipulability of the targets.
Both the temporal and the procedural interpretation are not
necessarily mutually exclusive. The above-mentioned differen-
tiation between the mechanism acting location- vs. identity-
conservatively in the temporal interpretation of course entails a
procedural element, as well as the as the procedural interpretation
includes a temporal element, such as the differences in processing
speed. The emphasis of the respective interpretations, however,
lies on the processing mechanism in the procedural interpreta-
tion and on differences in the processing time in the temporal
interpretation.
Within this context, it is finally important to emphasize the
functionality of this early dissociation. When predicting action
goals, the perception-action system has limited time to make accu-
rate estimations of future events. Focusing on location (rather than
identity) might be a useful“heuristic”often providing accurate and
fast estimations. This does not mean that infants are ignorant of
goal identity. With sufficient information and time, infants adjust
their behavior according to the configuration of goal locations and
identities.
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LOOKING TIMES TOWARD SPECIFIC AREAS OF INTEREST
Another important aspect of the present study that needs to be
discussed is the finding of Experiment 1 that the 9-month-olds
primarily looked at the goal object where the agent was both
during familiarization and test phase. The interpretation of this
finding can take two major routes. First, a radical interpreta-
tion would imply that data from studies using looking time as
a post-hoc measure for infants’ action expectations and their per-
ception of goal-directed actions might be overly generous about
infants’ knowledge. As mentioned earlier, looking time tasks mea-
sure infants’ expectations with fairly low spatial and temporal
resolution (Aslin, 2007) and the results can easily be biased by
low-level factors (see also Csibra, 2003). In the same line, it has
been argued, that associative learning processes might subserve
to a substantial part findings on early (social) cognition compe-
tences (Perner and Ruffman, 2005; Paulus et al., 2011a). For the
following reasons, the present data might as well call into question
the validity of the looking time tasks on action perception in gen-
eral. During the familiarization phase, the infants spent more time
looking at the familiarized (old) goal object than at the new goal
object. This leads to an increase of the relative novelty of the new
goal object in new goal/old location trials compared to old goal
object in the old goal/new location trials and one cannot rule out
that this relative novelty of surface features solely accounts for the
increase in looking times in the respective test trials and that such
a low-level explanation not only holds for the present data but for
all data coming from studies using the same paradigm. However,
there is evidence against such a low-level only explanation for the
paradigm in general coming from previous looking time studies.
These studies showed that at the same age, when infants do dif-
ferentiate between the old goal/new path and new/goal/old path
events when a familiar (grasping) action is performed by human
agent, they do not show the same looking time pattern when a
human agent performs an unfamiliar action (consisting in drop-
ping the back of the hand on the object; Woodward, 1999; Hofer
et al., 2005) or the human agent is replaced by an non-human
agent performing the same action (e.g., mechanical claws, rods,
occluders; Woodward, 1998). However, while the low-level factors
of these studies can be assumed to be identical, the infants’ looking
times were not.
We favor an alternative interpretation of our data suggesting a
developmental trajectory with the identity-related action expec-
tation measured post-hoc at an early age being a precursor of the
identity-related action expectation measured online at a later age.
This interpretation is supported by the finding that all 9-month-
olds who performed identity-related predictions in Experiment
1 showed respective identity-related looking times (i.e., longer
looking to changes in goal identity compared to changes in goal
location). In contrast, the reversed pattern could not be found;
infants who showed identity-related looking times did not neces-
sarily perform identity-related predictions. Similar developmental
trajectories including dissociations between post-hoc measures
and online measures early in life have been reported in tasks test-
ing infants’ knowledge about physical events. Expectations were
measured online via manual search tasks where the children did
not receive any feedback about the outcome of an observed event.
Piaget, for example, has shown that infants do not manually search
for hidden objects until they reach the age of 7.5–9 months. He
concluded that it is not until this age that infants understand
that hidden objects continue to exist (Piaget, 1952, 1954). In con-
trast, using post-hoc measures it has been shown that infants as
young as 2.5 months do have some understanding about the con-
tinuity of hidden objects (Baillargeon et al., 1985; Wilcox et al.,
1996). Similarly, when infants’ knowledge about physical solidity
was assessed, infants differentiated between expected and unex-
pected events already at the age of 4 months when their knowledge
was measured post-hoc (Spelke et al., 1992). In contrast, when
tested in a manual search task, toddlers at the age of 2.5 years
still failed when they have to predict the position of an object
behind a barrier (Berthier et al., 2000). Further studies comparing
toddlers’ knowledge about physical solidity in a within-subjects
design showed that while toddlers failed to search at the cor-
rect location, they looked longer at an unexpected compared to
an expected outcome of the same task (Hood et al., 2003; Mash
et al., 2006). Keen (2003) concludes from these results that the
perception of unexpected event outcomes seems to be a fun-
dament upon which further knowledge about the world can be
built. However, having knowledge (as assed via post-hoc mea-
sures) seems to be substantially different from being able to use
that knowledge (as assessed via predictive gaze shifts or via man-
ual search actions). Predictive gaze shifts, similar to manual search
actions, not only require the evaluation of whether an observed
event makes sense or not, the require an active – although not
necessarily conscious – decision of where to shift gaze, a mea-
sure of the infants’ expectation before the outcome of an event is
perceivable. This requires the consideration of multiple potential
outcomes and the selection of the most appropriate one. Infants
are able to infer the outcome of an uncompleted event, when their
looking time is measured (Daum et al., 2008, 2009), or when they
have to imitate previously observed incomplete actions (Meltzoff,
1995; Hamlin and Woodward, 2005). Accordingly, the conclusion
by Keen (2003) fits as well for the present findings that the post-
hoc evaluation of a task as measured via looking times builds the
basis and is a prerequisite on which the online processing can be
built upon.
The slope of these developmental trajectories might very well
vary between different domains. Here we presented an animated
object and found that looking time and predictive gaze were dis-
sociated over several years. In their recent study, Cannon and
Woodward (2012) report earlier identity-related predictions when
infants were presented with a grasping hand instead of an ani-
mated agent. The results of this study showed that infants at the
age of 11 months were able to predict the goal of the grasping hand
based on its identity during familiarization. One might interpret
this finding as evidence for an earlier understanding of human
actions compared to non-human actions, the fact that children
at this age correctly predict the goal of a grasping action might,
however, also be caused by the fact that the infants were less con-
straint in the timing of their predictions. The infants did not have
to take into account the precise timing of the grasping action once
it stopped but could shift their gaze to one of the two objects
after the hand stopped. In contrast, in the present study, both
spatial and temporal aspects were needed to be integrated very
precisely in order to correctly predict the agent’s behavior. This
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was not necessarily the case in the above-mentioned study. Fur-
thermore, in the study by Cannon and Woodward (2012) the
hand was never occluded during the presentation, while in the
present study, in order to measure temporal and spatial aspects
of prediction, the agent was occluded for a certain amount of
time, what might have increased the difficulty of the task. Anyway,
the prediction of action goals when measured online does still
occur later, at the age of 11 months, than when measured post hoc
(Woodward, 1998; Luo and Baillargeon, 2005; Luo, 2011). Further
research will clarify how to what extent human and non-human
actions are processed differently and on which basis predictions
are made.
Finally, in the present study, we used a paradigm combining two
visual measures of children’s action perception. The dissociation
found is potentially not restricted to these two measures, quite the
contrary, as previous studies have shown, other measures such as
looking time and manual grasping (Hood et al., 2003; Mash et al.,
2003) or, dilation and predictive gaze (Gredebäck and Melinder,
2010) show comparable findings. This suggests that it is likely that
for almost all measures of infant behavior, dissociations will be
found as long as they are based on different temporal constraints,
different amounts of information and, accordingly, tap potentially
different underlying processing mechanisms.
FINAL CONCLUSION
In the present study, we explored the relation of two different mea-
sures used to investigate infants’ expectations about goal-directed
actions. We compared post-hoc measures of infants’ expectations
(via looking time) with online measures concerning their predic-
tion (via predictive gaze). The looking times reflected identity-
related expectations already at the age of 9 months. In contrast,
predictive gaze pattern show that at a young age infants base their
predictions primarily on the location of a goal object while it is only
after the third birthday that predictive gaze reflects identity-related
expectations as well.
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